http://oglobo.globo.com/opiniao/mat/2010/10/27/a-ilusao-do-bric-922886469.asp

Por Oliver Stuenkel

O principal legado do presidente Lula no campo da política externa é o fortalecimento das parcerias do Brasil com outras potências emergentes, sobretudo os países do Bric. O comércio com a China está em expansão. Entrou em vigor um acordo de isenção de vistos entre Brasil e Rússia. As relações com a Índia nunca estiveram melhor. O Brasil está certo de querer forjar vínculos bilaterais mais estreitos com os gigantes asiáticos emergentes.

Mas, embora o Brasil deva fortalecer os vínculos individualmente, o próximo presidente brasileiro deve tomar cuidado para não levar a aliança Bric demais a sério. A marca melhorou a imagem do Brasil, mas juntar forças e apostar na importância estratégica da aliança não pode senão resultar em decepção. A marca Bric, criada pelo banqueiro Jim O’Neill, não vai sobreviver a longo prazo.

Que o acrônimo Bric tenha deixado de ser mero termo de investimento para se tornar uma realidade política não é sinal de presciência de O’Neill. O triunfo da marca Bric e sua aceitação entusiástica até por parte de seus “membros”, apesar de suas inadequações, indicam o anseio não satisfeito das potências emergentes de compreenderem um mundo cada vez mais complexo, e que lugar nele lhes cabe.

O desafio de encontrar maneiras categóricas de entender o mundo tem precedentes. Historicamente, acadêmicos buscaram estabelecer distinções entre países ao classificá-los por categorias e blocos organizados de acordo com diferentes variáveis. Em 1946, Winston Churchill estabeleceu tal conceito quando introduziu a ideia da Cortina de Ferro. Pouco depois, Alfred Sauvy cunhou o termo Terceiro Mundo, ajudando seres humanos a entenderem o sistema internacional.

Atualmente, esses modelos já não têm significado, e há muitas propostas para novas maneiras de se repensar a realidade geopolítica. Quando criou os Brics, O’Neill estava apenas considerando aspectos econômicos; sendo assim, os países que ele escolheu eram muito heterogêneos. O Brasil e a Índia são duas democracias que ainda não estão plenamente estabelecidas na atual ordem mundial, enquanto a China e a Rússia, dois regimes não democráticos, são poderes estabelecidos desde 1945. Os quatro discordam sobre quase tudo, incluindo mudança climática, direitos humanos e a reforma da governança global.

Apesar de todos estes fatores, o termo Brics virou um conceito chave entre analistas. Os líderes do Brasil, da Índia, da Rússia e da China começaram a se referir a eles mesmos como “membros do Bric”. Em 2009, os presidentes Lula e Hu Jintao e os primeiros-ministros Medvedev e Singh encontraram-se em São Petersburgo para uma cúpula do Bric.

Por que os quatro líderes decidiram juntar-se e transformar a categoria de investimentos de O’Neill em realidade política? O que mais os unia parecia ser seu interesse comum em mudar a maneira como o mundo era conduzido. Após o otimismo inicial e os grandes anúncios de uma “nova ordem mundial”, no entanto, os membros do Bric deram-se conta de que suas posições eram demasiadamente divergentes para concordarem sobre quaisquer medidas específicas. A categoria de O’Neill é ampla demais para ser significativa.

O que o sucesso da marca Bric realmente mostrou é que os acadêmicos e investidores não são os únicos a buscar uma categoria que possa capturar a realidade. Chefes de Estado anseiam, igualmente, por uma maneira significativa de compreender o mundo. Os quatro líderes encontraram-se em São Petersburgo essencialmente para “experimentar” a categoria que O’Neill tinha inventado para eles. Em vez de apontar para as semelhanças, seu comportamento refletia o forte desejo de entender a que categoria eles pertenciam. Em um mundo de rápidas mudanças, onde parâmetros tradicionais tais como ocidente e oriente, norte e sul e rico e pobre já não orientam as potências emergentes, colocar o “chapéu Bric” foi apenas outro episódio, embora certamente não o último, na busca complexa de sua identidade e de seu lugar em um mundo que vão, em breve, dominar.

OLIVER STUENKEL é cientista político.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6776/brazil-should-act-on-nuclear-transparency

Oliver Stuenkel | 20 Oct 2010

Although Dilma Rousseff failed to secure an absolute majority in the first round of Brazil’s presidential election, she seems certain to beat her rival Jose Serra in the run-off voting on Oct. 31 to become Brazil’s first female president. As current President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s hand-picked successor, Rousseff represents policy continuity, and her likely victory shows the degree to which Brazilians are happy with the track their country is on. Yet one disturbing issue has been largely overlooked by both domestic and international commentators during the election campaign: Since 2004, Brazil has refused to grant inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, full access to its nuclear facilities, in violation of Brasilia’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Lula has justified this stance by arguing that Brazil has no intention of seeking nuclear weapons. Not only does the country’s constitution forbid them, but Brazil is also a signatory to both the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco banning nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Even taking Lula at his word, the fact that Brazil even allows such a discussion to take place negatively affects its reputation. If Brazil really has no intention of developing nuclear bombs, why does it not simply play by the international rules?

The motivations for Brazil’s policy remain a mystery to outsiders. One would think that as a democracy located in one of the most peaceful regions on earth, and as a country that seeks greater global influence, Brazil would be a vocal supporter of the NPT. Instead, Brazil’s stance unnecessarily triggers global suspicion and damages its national interests. Brazil has argued that by refusing the IAEA greater access to its nuclear facilities, it merely seeks to protect commercial secrets from the agency’s inspectors. But this justification is unconvincing, since the U.N. inspectors have an excellent record of keeping these secrets.

Brazil’s next president should instead take a clear stand in support of nuclear transparency by reopening all of Brazil’s nuclear facilities to the IAEA. Only that will put an end to the uncertainty that is undermining Brazil’s credibility and its ability to realize its foreign policy objectives — including obtaining a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.

The Brazilian government has historically been critical of the nonproliferation regime, characterizing it as an attempt to freeze the international power structure and contain emerging powers such as Brazil. After reportedly pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil shifted gears, becoming a responsible stakeholder by signing the NPT in 1998.

However, in 2004, Brazil took the unusual step of not allowing the IAEA’s inspectors free access to all of the country’s nuclear facilities, which constitutes a violation of its obligations under the NPT. At the time, some Brazilian officials called signing the NPT a mistake, characterizing the treaty as an effort by the “established nuclear powers . . . to fortify their oligopoly of power” — comments that caused consternation and anxiety abroad. Since then, Brazil has assumed an even more obstructionist stance: During the 2010 NPT Conference, Brazil was one of the least-constructive members in discussing issues such as improving monitoring by IAEA inspectors, and has refused to sign the Additional Protocol that would allow more intrusive IAEA inspections and oversight. Brazil has also rejected proposals to make the Additional Protocol the default inspection regime for NPT signatories.

Certainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty has its weaknesses, as its critics rightly argue. Yet despite its flaws, the treaty has helped limit the number of nuclear weapons states, and is at least part of the reason that no nuclear bomb has been used in an attack since its signing. Rising powers such as Brazil and India resent the fact that the NPT does not reflect changes in the international distribution of power that have occurred since it was signed. For instance, Brazil will soon become the world’s fifth-largest economy, but is subject to the inspection regime required of non-nuclear weapons states. By contrast, France, as a nuclear weapons signatory, maintains the strategic advantages that come with its treaty-protected status, despite a relative decline in global economic and diplomatic reach.

That has led some Brazilian strategists to advocate for reserving the right to develop nuclear weapons. But that rationale is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, the nuclear inequality institutionalized under the NPT is still preferable to the anarchic equality that would result from a world in which many more states possess nuclear weapons. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer a requirement for great power status. Brazil is at no disadvantage compared to India, for instance, despite the latter having developed nuclear weapons. To the contrary, Brazil could conceivably use its status as the only BRIC member without nuclear weapons to play a leading role in the quest for global disarmament.

Toying with the nuclear weapons option, on the other hand, is likely to destabilize the region, significantly harming Brazil’s national interests and undermining its efforts to emerge as a leader in the 21st century global order. Whether Rousseff or Serra ultimately wins the election, Brazil’s next president should take action to end all speculation about Brazil’s nuclear program. That would allow Brazil to dedicate its time and energy to assuming a global leadership role in more meaningful areas such as poverty reduction, climate change, and the democratization of global governance.

Oliver Stuenkel is visiting professor of International Relations at the University of São Paulo and a fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.

This is all the more worrisome because China, India and Brazil are key players with regards to virtually every single global challenge. Take poverty. Over the past thirty years, China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty- the largest poverty reduction in the history of mankind. In India, a staggering 300 million people remain poor, more than on the entire African continent, yet this number will fall quickly as India modernizes. In Brazil, large scale cash-transfer programs to parents dependent on their children’s regular school attendance, paired with unprecedented economic growth, has cut the number of the poor to 40 million. In short, the three understand a lot about poverty and how to fight it. All three are so-called “emerging donors”, applying successful projects in their region and in Africa, where they are ever more prominent. President Obama would therefore be well-advised end an anachronistic tradition of having an American lead the World Bank. Rather, he should offer the World Bank Presidency to a skilled technocrat from one of these emerging powerhouses.

Climate change is no different. Brazil, India and China are probably the three key players in the battle against global warming. As China and India grow, and as their middle classes will buy refrigerators and cars, their environmental impact on the planet is too vast to comprehend. If China continues to grow at current rates, its oil consumption alone will surpass, in a few decades, the world’s current consumption. India lags China by a decade or so, but both are bound to become the world’s prime polluters. China has already surpassed the United States as the world’s top carbon emitter. Brazil, on the other hand, seems destined to offer solutions and assume global leadership on climate change. Among the world’s large economies, it is by far the cleanest one. Hydropower produces the majority of Brazil’s electricity, and it is the world’s largest producer of sugar cane-based ethanol, a key product to reduce China’s and India’s dependence on oil. In addition, Brazil is home to the Amazon, the largest carbon sink in the world, and it is the pioneer in developing programs to incentivize the forest’s inhabitants to preserve it.

Furthermore, Brazil, China and India are indispensable nations in the battle against nuclear proliferation. International efforts to pressure Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions have shown that the United States is no longer able to succeed without the help of the three emerging giants. Both China and India have significant economic interests in Iran, so imposing sanctions comes at a lot higher cost to them than to America. Brazil, more ideologically motivated, actively engaged with Iran to negotiate a separate deal. Brazil was not particularly interested in Iran’s plight; rather, it sought to make a broader argument that current structures of global governance are unjust. Brazil’s vote against sanctions in the UN Security Council severely reduced the measures’ largely symbolic value.

Finally, the three rising powers are indispensable for international efforts to promote democracy and defend human rights, an issue complicated by China’s human rights violations at home. America can no longer seriously pressure any government without Beijing’s approval. China’s, India’s and Brazil’s economies are so large by now that any dictatorship in the world can easily weather sanctions imposed by Europe and the United States- they simply strengthen ties to the emerging powers. Khartoum’s brand new skyscrapers and Mugabe’s ability to hold on to power in Zimbabwe are the ultimate proof that it is possible to get by without America. This points to a more fundamental question. Rising powers may seek more voting rights in today’s international institutions, but in how far are they willing to provide global public goods? Ranting against American hegemony is politically convenient and sometimes even justified. Yet one cannot deny that the United States has also played, and continues to play, a crucial role as the ultimate provider of global public goods- most importantly, in the security realm. As America will be increasingly less capable of providing global order, rising must step up to the plate and articulate a clearer vision of how and where they will not merely play to their domestic audiences, but assume global leadership. Brazil’s and India’s decision to turn into IMF lenders is a good start. The UN’s climate conference in Mexico in December may be another platform for rising powers to team up, provide thought leadership, and present a compelling proposal to underline their ambitions.

download pdf version here: Brazil election

记者◎蒲实

10 月 3 日，巴西 2010 年总统大选举 行投票。选前民调有望首轮获胜的执政 党劳工党候选人迪尔玛·罗塞夫获得约 46.9% 的选票，未能过半数。根据巴西宪法， 她将与获得 32.6% 选票、得票第二的社会 民主党候选人若泽·塞拉进入第二轮对决。
“3 个月前，还没有人知道迪尔玛 ·罗 塞夫是谁，现任总统卢拉的支持使得她在一 瞬间成为许多巴西人心中毫无悬念的下一任 总统。”巴西圣保罗大学国际关系学院的贾 尼纳·欧努吉 (Janina  Onuki) 教授告诉本 刊记者。6 月，当卢拉的劳工党正式宣布罗 塞夫为总统候选人时，对于巴西民众来说还 很面生的她才从幕后走到前台，而站在她身 后的“拉拉队长”就是人气超高、执掌巴西 8 年的“巴西最伟大的总统”卢拉。罗塞夫 宣言 ：“在这位伟大的男人之后，巴西将由 一位女人来治理，这个女人将延续卢拉的巴 西。”巴西政治咨询协会主席卡洛斯·曼哈 内里 (Carlos Manhanelli) 曾在首轮大选前 评论道 ：“劳工党让大选成为‘如果你喜欢 卢拉，那就支持罗塞夫’的投票，她现在就 可以让裁缝去准备总统就职仪式的礼服了。” 作为经济学家的罗塞夫 2003 年出任卢 拉政府的能源部长，不久后被任命为总统府 办公厅主任 ，参与卢拉政府各项政策的制 定，被卢拉称为“巴西经济加速增长计划之 母”。她被称为“铁娘子”，其强硬的作风形 成于上世纪六七十年代武装反抗巴西军事 独裁的岁月，作为游击队员的罗塞夫曾因此 入狱 3 年，其间饱受折磨。与有多年执政 经验的竞争对手、圣保罗州州长塞拉相比， 她 2001 年才加入卢拉的劳工党，也从未参 加过竞选。她不善言辞，也不具备卢拉那样 的明星气质和个人魅力，却在巴西政界迅速 攀升。人们希望维持经济高速增长和对低收 入家庭援助扩大的现状，而罗塞夫无疑代表 着卢拉传统和成功政策的延续。
德 国 全 球 公 共 政 策 研 究 所 研 究 员、 巴西问题专家奥里弗 ·施敦克尔 ( O l i v e r Stuenkel) 对本刊记者说 ：“至 9 月中旬，罗 塞夫的支持率一直领先于塞拉，且优势不断 拉大，大部分分析都预测罗塞夫会在第一轮 胜出。但随后媒体曝出罗塞夫的竞选助手埃 雷妮丝·格拉（Erenice Guerra）的政治丑闻， 罗塞夫的支持率停止了攀升。格拉女士当 时接任了总统府办公厅主任，她的家人被 指控从帮助民营企业获得未公开招标的公 共工程合同中受贿。”丑闻成为对手塞拉竞 选宣传的主打内容，宣传片播放格拉和罗 塞夫在一起的画面，以强调两人长时间的 工作关系。圣保罗大学经济史教授米里安 姆·多尔尼科夫 (Miriam Dolhnikoff) 亦向 本刊表示 ：“劳工党领袖认为，罗塞夫未能 首轮胜出，是因为有报道称 ，她支持放开 严厉的堕胎禁令计划 （罗塞夫对此否认）， 导致一部分福音基督教选民转向虔诚的绿 党基督教候选人玛丽娜·席瓦尔。但我认为， 席尔瓦分流的这部分选民，并非出于宗教 原因而改变立场，而是反对政府腐败。”
“若泽·塞拉是一位很有能力的行政 管理人员。”施敦克尔说 ，“在任巴西卫生 部部长期间，他所采取的应对艾滋病政策 已经成为世界各国的范本。他的支持者来 源于他的巴西人口最多的圣保罗州 ，还包 括高收入人群和很多对罗塞夫增强国家在 巴西经济中角色的计划持批判立场的商人。 塞拉最大的问题是，他是一位技术官僚， 缺乏鼓动人心和动员民众的个人魅力 。如 果他获胜，他也会延续卢拉的大部分政策， 但很可能会减少政府开支的规模。”多尔尼 科夫则认为 ：“如果塞拉当选，我不认为他 会改变卢拉的政策 ：卢拉的经济政策实际 上延续了他的前任、费尔南多·恩里克·卡 多佐总统的政策 ，而这位为巴西经济成功 奠基的卡多佐总统就来自于塞拉所属的社 会民主党。” 在 10 月 30 日大选前的这些天里 ，首 轮投票中排名第三的绿党候选人玛丽娜将 做出何种决定，将在一定程度上决定谜底。 施敦克尔说 ：“她拥有 19% 的支持者 ，这 部分人支持塞拉还是罗塞夫无疑至关重要。 目前看来，她有可能保持反对党地位 ，以 便在 2014 年大选中有机会胜出。”欧努吉则 认为 ：“选后第一次民调显示，罗塞夫的支 持率为 48%，塞拉为 41%，后者有明显上升。 玛丽娜的支持者多为大学和知识分子阶层， 这部分选票可能会转投塞拉。”另一影响决 胜局的关键因素是，“是否会有新的腐败丑 闻在这一关键时期浮出水面 ，一旦有，社 民党将发起攻势”。多尔尼科夫说。■
20 三联生活周刊  2010年第42期

Ties between Russia and Brazil have been virtually dormant for most of their history.  Except for a few Brazilian Marxist intellectuals who travelled to Moscow during the Cold War,  ties between the two rarely exceeded basic commercial exchange. In the Soviets’ eyes, Brazil has too closely aligned with the United States. It certainly did not help that the Brazilian government outlawed the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) in 1947. It took until the 1970s for Brazilian governments to overcome their antipathy towards the Soviet Union. This resulted in a first cooperation agreement between the two. Brazil began to import Soviet oil,  and mutual trade in 1976 stood at $ 440 million, but it remained far lower than between the Soviet Union and Argentina. Brazil’s generals continued to react sensitively to communist subversive elements at home, and the PCB remained illegal.

HARD RUSSIA, SOFT BRAZIL

There are certainly some striking similarities between the two.  Both continental countries and self-declared regional leaders, Russia and Brazil are extremely rich in natural resources, a characteristic that makes them important suppliers to China. While China has helped them weather the recent recession, both Russia (oil, gas) and Brazil (soy, iron ore) will need to be extremely careful not to enter in an unequal relationship with China, which buys up natural resources and sells value-added products in return.

But Russia and Brazil also differ fundamentally. Russia is perhaps the best example of a country with lots of hard power and virtually no soft power. It retains one of the largest armies nuclear stockpiles in the world, and two years ago it did not hesitate to use force against its Georgian neighbor. It is also increasingly autocratic, the opposition and the press is harassed, nationalism and racism are rife, and life expectancy is the lowest in the entire developed world. The “Russian narrative” is not exactly one many countries seek to emulate. Russia’s long-term prospects are bleak: Unable to promote innovation or to diversify, no Russian government has been able to wean off the economy from oil and gas, and Russia will be at the mercy of global commodity prices. In addition, little can be done about a historic demographic decline that makes it ever harder for Russia to populate its Far East.

Brazil, on the other hand, lacks a large army or the nuclear weapons of the other thee BRIC countries, but its strong democratic institutions, respect for human rights and vibrant civil society give Brazil, despite its flaws, the power of example. Corruption, a lack of decent universal education and unacceptable levels of socio-economic inequality and violence need to be tackled more effectively by future governments, but there is a general expectation, both at home and abroad, that Brazil is up to the task.

LET’S BE FRIENDS

Despite these differences, the nineties saw a rapprochement between Brazil and Russia. In 1997 until a series of meaningful agreements were signed to promote economic cooperation, motivated by President Cardoso’s f conviction that Brazil would need to diversify its partnerships in an unstructured, quickly globalizing post-Cold War scenario. Similarly, Russia had undergone a historic liberalization process in the early 1990s and was eager to broaden its economic ties.

The Brazilian-Russian friendship grew even stronger after President Lula took over. In 2005, he met Putin in Moscow to proclaim a ‘strategic partnership’. Since then, Brazil and Russia have started working together in the areas of space and defense technology. They are also bound to increase collaboration in the fields of reactor development and uranium exploration technology, where Russia could help Brazil develop its uranium industry. Brazil’s  uranium deposits are said to be the sixth-largest in the world. In addition, aircraft construction and air transport, the energy sector, satellite technology, infrastructure projects, and medicine are promising and attractive areas for bilateral business cooperation. In 2008, Russian exports amounted to $ 2 billion while imports stood at $ 4.7.

BUT CAN THEY AGREE ON ANYTHING?

Despite their leaders’ best efforts, the Brazilian-Russian project is no shoe-in. Ties on the society level are likely to remain low, even though tourism may increase significantly since visa rules have eased. With regards to the most pressing global challenges– climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, poverty and the democratization, there are few areas where the two can agree. While Brazilians are increasingly aware of the necessity to deal with climate change pragmatically, this notion has yet to gain traction in Russia. With regards to nuclear proliferation, it is not Russia, but Brazil who is unlikely to support stricter monitoring by the IAEA, the UN’s watchdog. In the realm of aid diplomacy,  Brazil is beginning to turn into an ‘emerging donor’, while combating poverty across the world is not a priority for Russia. Finally, despite Russia’s rhetoric, it will not actively support a reform of global governance. This is understandable, as Russia is a nuclear weapon state under the NPT, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member of the G8. It is thus a classic ‘status quo’ power with limited interests to help Brazil undo current structures. While economic ties in some areas such as defense and nuclear technology may intensify, expectations in the political realm should therefore be managed carefully.

Oliver Stuenkel

KAS – Auslandsinformationen 10-2010

Vollständiger Text hier

Brasiliens wirtschaftlicher Aufstieg im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte ist durchaus erstaunlich. Während Brasiliens Wachstum nicht ganz so beachtlich ist wie das der anderen BRIC-Staaten (Russland, Indien und China), liegt der entscheidende Vorteil des Landes gegenüber den anderen Schwellenländern darin, dass die internationalen strategischen Bedrohungen, denen sich das Land gegenüber sieht, weniger zahlreich und weniger gefährlich sind.
Dies bedeutet nicht, dass Brasilien überhaupt keinen Bedrohungen ausgesetzt ist: Drogenhandel, Waffenschmuggel und Guerilla-Aktivitäten in einem gesetzlosen Grenzgebiet im Bundesstaat Amazonas sind die wohl größten äußeren Sicherheitsrisiken des Landes. Bedrohlich für den weltweit führenden Exporteur landwirtschaftlicher Produkte sind auch der Klimawandel und die Zerstörung des Regenwalds, die auf mangelnde Regierungskontrolle in der Region zurückzuführen sind, da sie die Klimalage in diesem stark von Regen abhängigen Land verändern könnten.

Trotz allem ist Brasilien in einer weitaus günstigeren Lage als China, Indien und Russland. Indien etwa sieht sich nicht nur einem Grenzkonflikt mit Pakistan im Westen und China im Nordosten, dem instabilen Nepal im Norden und dem vom Krieg erschütterten Sri Lanka im Süden gegenüber. Es wird auch durch erbitterte maoistische Aufstände in weiten Teilen des Ostens und Nordostens des Landes bedroht. Russland seinerseits sieht seine einflussreiche Rolle im Westen durch die Erweiterung der NATO und………

Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute
(Discussion Paper 11/2010)
ISBN: 978-3-88985-519-0
Preis: 6,00 €

download paper here

Brazil and India are undergoing profound transformations as they become global actors. As their international engagement increases, they nevertheless continue to possess characteristics common to other developing countries. Forty million Brazilians and 300 million Indians live under the poverty line, representing more than one third of the world’s poor. Against this backdrop, Brazil’s and India’s emergence and their views on addressing global development challenges have important implications for international development policy. Brazil’s and India’s ascendance will create changes in two areas. First, as emerging powers, they will seek greater weight in international development institutions. This may alter the way those institutions operate. Second, as increasingly prominent donors, Brazil’s and India’s role raises questions about their impact on development procedures established by the Western-dominated Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Brazil and India, increasingly engaged in both their respective regions and in Africa, are attempting to differentiate themselves from traditional donors. This study analyses both countries’ motivations and strategies as rising actors in the multilateral context and as emerging bilateral donors, evaluates the potential impacts their presence will have on development policy, and points to opportunities for European actors to engage with both Brazil and India.

Go to article here

As voters go to polls for the Brazil election today, support from popular outgoing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is expected to propel candidate Dilma Rousseff to victory.

By Andrew Downie, Correspondent / October 3, 2010

Oliver Stuenkel, International Reports,  Sep. 30, 2010
Ed.: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.20670/

Brazil’s economic rise over the past decade has been nothing short of astonishing. While Brazil’s growth has not been as impressive as that in the other BRIC countries (Russia, India and China), Brazil’s key advantage over the other emerging powers is that the international strategic threats it faces are fewer and less dangerous. This does not mean that Brazil faces no threats at all: drug-trafficking, arms smuggling and guerrilla activity in a lawless frontier region in the Amazon are probably the most potent security threats Brazil faces from abroad.

To download full text in pfd format, click here

OLIVER STUENKEL: SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS – Oct 01 2010 18:35

http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-10-01-south-africa-must-woo-lulas-successor

Brazil’s presidential election on October 3 marks the beginning of a new era for Latin America’s biggest nation. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula in Brazil, steps down after eight years in power.

His presence in Brazilian politics is as old as Brazil’s democracy itself: the former union leader has participated in every direct presidential election since democratisation in the late 1980s. Lula became president on his fourth attempt, in 2002, and shaped Brazilian politics like no other in recent decades.

He also travelled to Africa more than any other Brazilian president in history and a cornerstone of his foreign policy has been stronger ties to developing countries. Brazilian exports to Africa more than tripled (to $8,7-billion) in 2009

South Africa’s relationship with Brazil blossomed during Lula da Silva’s presidency. South Africa must keep relations warm as Lula’s successor is unlikely to focus on Africa. (Ricardo Moraes, Reuters)

and South Africa is one of Brazil’s most important African trade partners. During Lula’s time in office, Brazil doubled its number of embassies in Africa to 34. South Africa has been the major beneficiary of Lula’s South-South diplomacy, which helped Africa’s most prosperous nation to strengthen its international standing and strategic weight.

Yet Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, an uninspiring technocrat, is unlikely to focus on Africa as much and may neglect it altogether as she faces formidable domestic challenges, such as urgent tax and pension reform. As the continent’s leader, South Africa’s president must thus be more proactive and reach out to Brazil’s future president if he wants to prevent relations falling back to the low level of the Nineties.

Ties between South Africa and Brazil have traditionally been insignificant. During apartheid Brazil preferred to engage with Africa’s Portuguese-speaking countries, principally Angola and Mozambique. Brazil supported the ANC and, after South Africa’s first free elections in 1994, Brazil’s then-president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, became the first Brazilian head of state to visit South Africa.

Brazil and South Africa began to collaborate on the issue of HIV-drug patents during the Cardoso administration, but relations intensified after Lula took office in 2003, finding their high point in the creation of Ibsa, a trilateral alliance of India, Brazil and South Africa, in which governments and civil society can exchange expertise in areas in which they face similar challenges. Meaningful collaboration is now taking place in the fight against HIV/Aids, cash-transfer programmes to combat poverty and ways to foster social mobility.

Having grown up in poverty himself, Lula cares about development issues, particularly in Africa. He tirelessly points out that Brazil has the second-largest black African population after Nigeria, justifying the special relationship between Brazil and Africa. Trade between Brazil and South Africa increased to nearly $1,7-billion in 2009 and further agreements were made this year, including annual political consultations.

While the Brazilian-South African friendship has grown stronger in the past eight years, there is still upward potential.

Brazil has been the motor behind the idea of South-South diplomacy, most visible in Ibsa, which has boosted South Africa’s international stature significantly. But more can be done jointly to tackle the domestic challenges both South Africa and Brazil face — urban violence, the need to improve education and the promotion of economic growth to lift millions out of poverty.

In addition, their geostrategic position is similar in that both countries are emerging but not yet well integrated into international structures. Most importantly, both countries’ objective of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has yet to be fulfilled. In this quest Brazil and South Africa would be well advised to collaborate — a joint bid (possibly with India) is likely to enhance chances for success. It is only in alliance with other emerging powers such as Brazil that South Africa will be able to influence the global agenda in coming decades.

Oliver Stuenkel is a visiting professor of international relations at the University of São Paulo and a fellow of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin

Source: Mail & Guardian Online